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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J.DrF;S S. S'l'ANK and
PRISCILLA 1\L 8TANK
dba ACl\IE AUDIT ASSOCIATES,
Plaintiffs-Respond en ts,
-VS.-

Case
No. 10276

JOHN ROBERT JONES,

Def end ant-Appellant.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE

The question is whether Plaintiffs-Respondents, as
assignees of several claims for collection, are entitled to
prosecute suit on the claims in their own name, or if the
assignors are indispensable parties.
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT

The 'rrial Court denied defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties.
1

,.,
I

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek confirmation of the judgment of ,
the Lower Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant's Statement of l<~acts includes M·
eral conjectural matters. 'l'he facts, as indicated lir
the present state of the record, are as followi,;:
Plaintiffs-Respondents filed thii,; action in the Third
Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah, as the
assignees of several claims against the Defemla11t-.\rpellant. A written assignment of each claim was cwcuted by the assignor and delivered to plaintiff assignee.
Pursuant to the demaud of Defendant-Appl'llant
the Plaintiff-Respondents, who are reside11ts of Dl'11nr,
Colorado, executed and filed with the Trial Comt a noliresident cost bond in or about Fehruary, lf)(i4, wliid1 ;,
now current and effective.
On or about the 19th day of Nonmher l~J(i4, senr:tl
motions having been theretofore heard and determinr·cl
by the Trial Court, a further hearing wai,; hall on .\p
pellant 's motion to dismiss or for judgnwnt on the plrad
ings. This motion was made upon the sole, stated gronwl
that Plaintiff's assignors were indispensable parti<';; 111
the action ( R-45).
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ARGU:\IENT
POINT I
'1 HI<: ASSIGNJ'vIENTS WITH WHICH THIS
('ON'l'ROVERSY IS CONCERNED WERE
Ft:LL AND COMPLETE AND THE ASSIGN~~ES AR~~ THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
1:; THIS SUIT.
1

A 110tarizecl written assignment ·was executed and de!i1rred t.o Plaintiffs-Respondents by each of the assignors ol' the claims here in controversy. In each instance
the ast>ig11or assig11ecl to Plaintiffs, "their heirs, execut111,-, administrators and assigns, all my right, title and
i11tr·rest in and to a certain account current and statr•tl. ... '' Further, each assit,,rnment states, "Hereby authorizing· tl10 said assignees, their agents, attorneys,
heirs allll nssig11s, to receive, sue for, collect and rer·c·ipt for ~urh account in their name or otherwise and to
rlrr aml iwrform every act and thing necessary and proper to be clonr in the premises, irrevocably, as fully as I
might or could do if personally present at the doing
thereof.''
B~- the express language of these written ass1gn-

IOl'nls tlw assignors have assigned ALL of their "right,
title and interPst'' in the claims in controversy. It is,
therefore, a complete contradiction of the facts to state
that the assignors ''retained an intereest in the action.''
l1nless arnl until these actions are reassigned to the
original assignors, the latter have no legal interest in the
action a]](l cannot legally maintain any separate action
against Appellant on an individual claim heretofore

3

assigned to Plaintiffs-Respondents. It may be thai
assignors have acquired a new beneficial interest in the
net proceeds of the claim assigned, but this creates a re.
lationship between the assignors and assignees with
which the debtor defendant cannot properly be roncerned. In fact, the assignor in each of these claims
has bargained and sold his legal title and interest thercill
to the assignees-plaintiffs, and has receind in part,
therefor, a contingent beneficial interest. But the only
concern of the debtor defendant here is whether or not
plaintiffs acquired the full and complete legal title. To
hold that plaintiffs have not acquired the full legal tit!P
is to do violence to the language of the contractural
agreement between the assignors and the assignees.
The McAulay Case cited by Appellant as authority
for the proposition that the plaintiffs' assignors an'
indispensable parties has a clearly distinguishable factual background. It should be noted immediately that
the facts do not involve an assignment. Therefore, any
argument, whatever its force or lack of force, must be
made by analogy. Respondents submit that there is no
force whatsoever in the cited case which can aid Apprllant 's cause. Clearly an undisputed 43 1/3 per rent interest in a claim would render the owner thereof an
indispensable party in an action brought to enforce the
claim. But, in citing this case, Appellant has erred in
that he has assumed the very question which he seeks
to raise and to have determined favorably to himself,
i. e.; whether Respondents' assignors have made a full
and complete assignment of their claims.
4

This Court has met the objection raised in this
appeal on several occasions and has consistently held
that the assignee is the real party in interest and that as
such, the assignors were not and could not he indispeniable parties. The precise question was raised in the
rase of Chesney v. District Co11rt of Salt Lake County,
9Y Utah 513, wherein the Court stated:
''Plaintiffs argue, in support of their position,
that Brown is not the real party in interest for
the reason that he is neither actually nor substantially interested in the subject matter of the suit,
and that his only interest, if such it can be called,
is that of collector. This court, in conformity with
the weight of judicial authority, is committed to
the doctrine that the assignee of a chose in action
or promissory note after maturity and for the
purpose of collection alone may sue in his own
name and as such is the real party in interest.''
Tl1e court cites considerable authority for the
holding.
In the case of Campbell v. Peter, 108 Utah 565, a case
decided some four years after the Chesney case, the Court
firmly restated the holding of the latter case when it
,,aid:

''We will not again go into the question of
whether an assignee of a chose in action who holds
merely for the purpose of collection is 'the real
party in interest.' We have repeatedly held that
he is." (Citing Chesney and other cases)
As recently as 1962 this Court has reaffirmed that
holding when, in Lynch v. McDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, reference is once again made with approval to the Chesney

and Campbell cases and others.

That this Court is on solid ground in this mat!r:r 1,

attested by our Sister Courts, wherein the Yast majority support the proposition that an assig11ee, €\'en
though his assignment be exclusively for collection aud
the whole beneficial interest be in the assignor, is the real
party in interest, and consequently, the assignor is not
and cannot be an indispensable party. Aside from the
Ohio Court cited by Appellant in his brief, the ease la\\'
indicates that there may be two jurisdictions whil'h
have followed a minority rule. Of the Westem States,
the Courts appear to line up solidly with the great weight
of authority, as espoused by this Court.
cases support this proposition:

The following

Rauers Law and Collection Co. v. Higgins, fr! P.
2d 450 (California)

National Reserve Co. of America v. illrtropolita11
Trust Co. of California, 112 P. 2d 598 (Californiu)
Ba1ikers Trust Co. v. International Trust Co., cl al ..
113 P. 2d 656 (Colorado)
Castleman v. Redford, 124 P. 2d 293 (NeYada)
National Motor Serrice Co. v. Walters, 379 I'. 2a
643 (Idaho), Citing Chesney v. District Court of Sa/I
Lake County
Amende v. Town of Morton, 241 P. 2cl 445 (Wasl1irnrton), (holding the particular assignment invalid hnt
affirming the general rule).
In the case of First National Bank of Topeka \'
United Telephone Association, 353 P. 2<l 963, a Kansn'
case, the Court discussed a factual situation which ,ms
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,r1uarely Ill point on the issue raised here. The sole
distiudio11 between the cited case an<l this suit, as it relates to the question of assignment, is that there the
assignor 11ad the complete benefical interest in the pro~eerls. Quoting ·with approval from an earlier case, the
Kausas C'ourt says at Pages 970-71:
"vVhen the owner of a note, for reasons satisfactory to himself, assigns it to another, thereby
n•sti11g iu him the full legal title, the assignee becomes, so far as the debtor is concerned, the real
party in interest. The original owner is still the
pernon to be finally benefited by the litigation, but
Iii;; legal demand is no longer against the maker of
the note, hut against the person to whom he has
assigneJ it. When the obligor is sued by such
assignee (no claim as innocent purchaser being
im·oh·l'd), he can make any defense he could
ha \'e made against the assignor; he is fully protected against another action; and in no way is it
a matter of the slightest concern to him what arrangement between the plaintiff and the original creditor occasioned the assignment. This
!wing true, it would be a sacrifice of substance to
form to permit the defendant to defeat the action
hy showing . . . that the plaintiff was bound to
account to his assignor for a part or all of the procPeds. We hold that the objection to the judgment
nrged on the ground that plaintiff was not the real
party in interest is untenable.''

Th~ n aso11ing of this opinion is deemed persuasive.
1

With reference to the prior case the Kansas Court
sairl at page D70:
'' ln the 1\Ianley decision the court reasserted
tlrnt the assignee, who holds the full legal title to
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a promissory note by assignment, is the real party
in interest and may maintain an action there 0;1
against the maker, notwithstanding he has no beneficial
. interest in the proceeds, the assi"nrnent
~
lmnng been made to enable him to realize on the
claim in the interest of the original payee.''
It appears clear that if the assignors of Plaintiff.
Respondent are not indispensable parties then the a,.
signee plaintiff must be the real party in interest. In faet,
the cases cited generally deal with the points as a single
issue and discuss them in the same context. Of course,
since Defendant-Appellant did not raise the issue of J'Pa]
party in interest below, it should not be given consideration by this Court except as it may be inseparable from
the question of indispensable party. In support of t!Ji,
principal, reference is made to:

Idaho State Bank v. Hooper Sugar Cu., 74 Utah~±.
Richard v. Strike, 66 Utah 394.
Flynders v. Hunter, 60 Utah 314.
Byron v. Payne, 58 Utah 536.
POINT II
THE TWELVE CAUSES OF AC'fION ARE
PROPERLY JOINED IN PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS' COMPLAINT, AND IN ANY
EVENT DEFENDANT - APPELLANT HAS
WAIVED THIS OBJECTION AND IS E8TOPPED TO ASS~'JRT IT EITHER IN THIS
COURT OR IN THE COURT BELOW.
Defendant-Appellant seeks for the first time on ap
peal, to raise an issue of misjoinder. This question ira'
8

not raised in the pleadings or in any proceedings whatsorrer in the Court below and suffers, therefore, from the
same defect as noted with reference to real party in intere~t and the cases cited in the last paragraph of Point I
The sole issue for which Defendant-Appellant
81Jorn.
sotiglit review in this Court, as appears from his petition (R-45), is the denial by the Trial Court of his motio11 to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party.
Except for the statement of Appellant in his brief
that " . . . several causes of action with independent
fact~ and independent parties are joined in one action"
there is no evidence in the record of any facts supporting
a claim of misjoinder. In fact, it is submitted that the
opposite is true and that ample evidence is adducible to
establish the propriety in law of this joinder. Howmr, 8ince the suit will only be delayed and quite possibly
result in further and subsequent appeal unless some
notiee is taken of the issue of misjoinder, the following
brief argument is submitted on the point.
Having failed to raise the issue of misjoinder either
by way of responsive pleading or motion, the Defendant.\ppellallt has waived whatever rights he may have had
otherwise and is estopped to raise the issue here or in
the lower Court. After approximately a year of hearing-R and proceedings on the issues of this case in the
101rer Court, during which time Appellant has raised a
series of issues, it would be unconscionable were he allowed to question the basis of the joinder at this juncture.

It is submitted that Rule 12, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure expressly prohibits this attempt to raise such
9

an objection or defense at this late elate.

Rnle 12 iii)

states in part:
"Every defense, in la''" or faet, to a daim for
relief in any plea<ling-, \YhPthN a rlaim, eoirntnclaim, crossclaim, or a third party claim, shall lie
asserted in the responsi,·e pleading therrto, if 0111 ,
is required, except that the fo]]o,Yi11g <lrfrrnei
may, at the option of the 11leacler, he mark himotion.''
·
The rule then lists seven defenses \Yhieh may he rai'r,rl
by motion including failure to join irnlispensahle part).
Rule 12 (h) provides:
''A party wain•s defenses and ohjcetio11'
which he does not present either hy motion a<
hereinhefore provided or, if he l1as made no m1Jtion, in his reply or ans\n:r, except (1) that tlJI'
defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can he granted, the clefe11se of failure to join
an inclispensa hle party, aml the ohj0ction of failnrr,
to state a leg-al clefe11se to a claim ma~· al~o lie
made hy a later pleading if one is pl'!'mittrd, or hy
motion for judgment on the pleaclillgs or at tlw
trial on merits .... ''
Having failed to object to the joirnler of the;-;e netions either by motion as prm·ided (and in this ca"e a
motion to dismiss was interposed before pl<>ading) or li)
ans-wer, such an objection come:-; too late and sl101iltl nnt
be entertained by any court. Moore's Federal Prnilin,

2d Ed., Volume 2, Page 2::\2!1.
Our Rules make appropriate remc>dies arnilabk tu
the Appellant if he can persuade the proprr ronrt that
11
he would be unjustly injurc<l hy joint trial of thrse '
10

tions; but Respondent submits that by Appellant's argument in Point III, even were it brought in the proper
Court and at the proper time, Appellant has completely
misconceived his remedy. The Courts do not favor a
multiplicity of actions.
POINT III
THIS PROCEEDING WAS COMMENCED IN
THE ONLY PROPER STATE TRIBUNAL.
Dcfenda11t-Appellant seeks in his argument, under
Point IV to eharge the plaintiffs and their assignors with
111iestionahle conduct in bringing the action in Utah.
In
this connection, it appears that Defendant-Appellant
1rnul<l have preferred to litigate the issues in Colorado
1rhere eaeh of the claimed liabilities arose. It was not
tl1e Plaintiffs nor their assignors who left the state of
Colorado, but the Appellant. The action was commenced
in the state tribunal which had jurisdiction of the Defendant-Appellant, and for the latter to complain of
thr natural legal consequences, whatever they may be, of
tl1iR faet is deemed unseemly in the very least. The Appellant iR at liberty to bring any proceeding he deems adrisable in the Colorado Courts against Plaintiffs'
assignors.
CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that on the only question which is properly presented in this appeal the Court
lias heretofore held consistently that the assignor of
a cauRe, though it be for collection, is not an indispensable
11

party to an action brought by the assignee thereon, but
the assignee is the real party in interest. This holdina
0
is in line with the overwhelming weight of authority an<l
there appears to be no persuasive reason to cha11gr· it
in the instant case.
There has been no misjoinder of actions, and h)·
bringing the objection up for hearing for the fir:;t timl·
upon appeal, after having filed a series of motions m111
an answer, and delaying approximately one year in bringing the objection up at all, Defendant-Appellant Im
waived the defense or objection and should be estopperl
to assert it either here or in the lower Court.
Respondents and their assignors should not be held
responsible for the election of the Def endanL\ ppellaut,
and having effectively denied jurisdiction over his person to the Colorado Courts by removing himself to rtillt.
he should not now be allowed to shift the legal re:-pon
sibility and consequences, thereof, to others.
Respondents submit that the nature of the assigi1
ments, upon the face thereof, show that Respondl'nb
acquired full legal title to the chose in action earh rqi
resented. Therefore, the judgment should be affirmerl.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSEN, SUMSION & MAD~E;;
65 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Respom!PnlY
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